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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Brandon Lee Anderson appeals from

his

judgment of conviction

for possession of

marijuana, possession 0f paraphernalia, delaying an ofﬁcer, attempted unlawful entry, and

He

two counts 0f felony battery 0n a police ofﬁcer.

claims the district court erred by

denying his motion t0 suppress evidence.

Statement

Of The

The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

district court

made

the following factual ﬁndings relevant t0 this appeal:

[O]n July the 23rd of 2017 at about 12:23 a.m., at least that’s what
the preliminary hearing facts had indicated, Deputy Ballman of the
Kootenai County Sheriff’s Ofﬁce was 0n patrol in the Dalton Gardens
area.

And,

was

in fact,

I

think

the—I think

just the Dalton

Gardens area

it

testiﬁed t0, but in Kootenai [C]0unty, and observed an individual

Brandon Anderson, walking
down the roadway. The Court’s familiar With the Dalton Gardens area and
is familiar that largely there are n0 sidewalks along those areas. That it’s a
roadway and then the side 0f the road and then on to people’s property,
ultimately identiﬁed as the defendant, Mr.

either

lawns 0r driveways 0r maybe ﬁelds.

But he saw Who was ultimately identiﬁed as Mr. Anderson, the
down one of the roadways in Dalton Gardens. And
Deputy Ballman turned his vehicle around. And in response to turning the
vehicle around t0 come back to contact Mr. Anderson, the defendant, Mr.
Anderson walked up t0 the front door of a house. A house that was
blacked out. N0 porch light on it. And just walked up to the front porch
of this residence.
defendant, walking

Deputy Ballman asked if he lived there. Got n0 response at ﬁrst.
Asked him What he was doing there. There was no
response at ﬁrst but eventually said he was going t0 ask for some water at
between midnight and 1:00 o’clock in the morning at a darkened house.
May have said something about, well, I know somebody a few houses
away and maybe I was going t0 get some water from them. Pretty vague
Eventually said n0.

answers for

sure.

Deputy Ballman at some point there called Mr. Anderson over t0
him and asked him his name. May have told him t0 stand by the patrol
car. And in that time frame another deputy by the name 0f [Franssen] had
advised Deputy Ballman that he knew who was out With Deputy Ballman
and this was Brandon Anderson and he had warrants out for his arrest.
(1

1/17/17 Tr., p.26, L.10

— p.27, L25.)

Deputy Franssen arrived 0n scene and, based on the ﬁve
Anderson “he was under
then “took 0f

p.10,

,”

arrest.”

jumping fences and running through the neighborhood.

(Id., p.9,

L.11

—

L6.)
after

eventually caught Anderson and grabbed

p.1

1,

Ls.19-21.)

At

sprayed Anderson in the face With
ofﬁcer] in the head.”

Anderson’s
slugfest

shirt in

him.

him

(1d,, p.9,

L.24 — p.10, L.2.)

“in an attempt to place

Ballman

him under

arrest.”

Anderson “immediately began ﬁghting with” Deputy

that point

Ballman, landing “multiple strikes.”

[the

Anderson

(Prelim. T121, p.9, Ls.6-14; p.14, Ls.10-16.)

So Deputy Ballman chased

(Id.,

active warrants, informed

OC

(Id.,

(1d,,

p.1

1,

L.25 — p.12, L.1.)

Deputy Ballman

spray; but Anderson, undaunted, started “striking

p.12, Ls.1-25.)

After Ballman grabbed ahold of

an attempt t0 subdue him, Anderson managed t0 “slip out” of the

and dart away.

(Id.,

p.13, Ls. 13-17; R., p.29.)

Deputy Franssen continued the pursuit and spotted Anderson, now
“trying t0 break into the back sliding glass door 0f a residence.”

(R., p.36.)

shirtless,

Anderson

“forced the screen door open” but the sliding glass door would not open, so Anderson

1

The preliminary hearing

transcript,

Which the

district court

took judicial notice 0f during

the motion to suppress hearing (11/17/17 Tr., p.19, Ls.9-18), can be found

through 12 of the augmented record on appeal.

0n pages

1

started kicking

(Prelim. Tr., p.27, Ls.15-23; R., p.36.)

it.

Deputy Franssen caught up

Anderson and pulled him away from the house and down
p.28, Ls.5-8.)

Anderson

struggled, pushing

deputy “[got] control over him and

[got]

to the ground.

p.28, L.4

(Id.,

Deputy Franssen ended up with a scratched hand, “an open cut on

jammed
Even

ring ﬁnger, “secondary

after

OC

(Prelim. Tr.,

and “mule kicking” Deputy Franssen

him handcuffed.”

exposure,” and a neck injury.

Anderson was handcuffed, he “continued

t0 struggle

—

and

until the

p.29,

[his] right

(Id.,

t0

L6.)

elbow” a

p.29, Ls.10-15.)

resist.”

(Id.,

p.29,

Ls.5-6.)

Additional deputies eventually arrived and helped contain Anderson and search

him.

(Id.,

p.29, Ls.8-9.)

They found “marijuana, a

glass pipe With burnt residue,

several scrapers” in Anderson’s “front pants pockets.”

(R.,

p.36.)

and

Anderson was

ultimately charged With possession of marijuana, possession 0f paraphernalia, attempted

unlawful entry, delaying an ofﬁcer, providing false information (for

initially

giving the

two counts 0f felony battery 0n law enforcement.

police ofﬁcers a false name), and

(R.,

pp.55-58.)

Anderson ﬁled a motion
granted and

75,

80-81).

is

to dismiss the false information charge

(Which was

not at issue 0n appeal) (R., pp.76-79), and a motion to suppress (R., pp.72-

Anderson argued

charges should be suppressed as

that the “possession

[fruit]

0f Marijuana and Paraphernalia

of the poisonous

tree

because Mr. Anderson was

detained without reasonable suspicion 0f criminal activity.” (R., p.72 (emphasis altered).)

The

district court

denied the motion, concluding

original detention;

and 2)

that, in

1) that

reasonable suspicion justiﬁed the

any event, Anderson was “searched incident

t0 [the]

arrests

and he had committed offenses by running for

discovery of“the items found 0n him.”

Anderson pleaded
p.94; 12/4/ 17 TL, pp.25-3

(1

it

and by resisting,” Which led

1/17/17 Tr., p.30, L.1

— p.3 1,

L.18.)

guilty to the attempted unlawful entry charge prior t0

1 .)

The remaining charges proceeded

t0 trial

to the

trial.

(R.,

and Anderson was

found guilty of possession of marijuana, possession 0f paraphernalia, delaying an ofﬁcer,

and both counts of felony battery 0n law enforcement.

Anderson received

(R., pp.151-52.)

credit for time served for the

misdemeanor counts.

(R.,

pp.168-71.) The district court sentenced Anderson to two concurrent ﬁve-year sentences

With two years ﬁxed, retaining jurisdiction, for the felonies.
timely appealed. (R., pp.175-78; 187-91.)

(R., pp.172-74.)

Anderson

ISSUES
Anderson

Did the

states the issue

0n appeal

district court err in

as:

denying Mr. Anderson’s motion t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p.5)

The

state rephrases the issues as:

Has Anderson

failed t0

show

the evidence should be suppressed, because he has

failed t0 address the district court’s holding that the evidence

was found

in a

search incident to arrest?

II.

Has Anderson
suppress?

failed t0

show

the district court erred in denying the motion to

ARGUMENT
I.

Anderson Fails To Show The Evidence Found On His Person Should Be Suppressed
Because He Has Failed To Challenge The District Court’s Conclusion That The Evidence

Was
“Where

Discovered In

a lower court

one 0f those grounds

makes a

A Search Incident To Arrest

ruling based

0n two

challenged on appeal, the appellate court must afﬁrm on the

is

uncontested basis.” Rich

V. State,

159 Idaho 553, 555, 364 P.3d 254, 256 (2015) (quoting

To

State V. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517-18, 164 P.3d 790, 797-98 (2007)).

arguments 0n appeal parties must raise issues in their opening
Dep’t of Health

& Welfare,

be considered by

that

“all

preserve

Patterson V. State

151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718, 729 (2011) (“In order to

arguments in the opening

and provide

brief.”).

found that the Anderson was appropriately detained in the ﬁrst

district court

and

instance,

briefs.

this Court, the appellant is required t0 identify legal issues

authorities supporting the

The

and only

alternative grounds

the

evidence that

appropriately gathered evidence.”

ﬂows from

that

appropriate detention

(11/17/17 Tr., p.31, Ls.9-11.)

additionally denied suppression because the evidence

was

But the

is

district court

collected incident t0 a lawful

arrest:

When

Mr. Anderson ran for

searched incident

(1

it

0n

Court

that, the

t0

and by

runningfor

is

it,

he was then seized and arrested.

He was

and he had committed oﬂenses by
and then the itemsfound 0n him. So based

those arrests
resisting

denying Defendant’s Motion

t0

Suppress Evidence.

..

.

1/17/17 Tr., p.31, Ls.12-17 (emphasis added).)

Anderson has only challenged the reasonable suspicion underlying the
encounter that he purports was a detention.
mention,

much

(E Appellant’s

brief, pp.6-9.)

less challenge, the district court’s conclusion that his

He

initial

does not

motion was also

being denied because he “committed offenses” by running and resisting and he was

(E Appellant’s brief.)

“searched incident to those arrests.”
court’s decision

must be afﬁrmed on

this

Accordingly, the

district

uncontested basis?

II.

Anderson

Fails

To Show The

District

Court Erred In Denying His Motion T0 Suppress

Evidence
A.

Introduction

Turning t0 the merits, Anderson argues the

motion
ofﬁcer

to suppress.

who

wearing

He makes one

all

black had reasonable and articulable [suspicion]

Anderson avers

Anderson based on a hunch.” (Appellant’s
Anderson’s argument

is

is

that, instead,

concluding the

disagreed with), the

initial

incorrect for

“Ofﬁcer Ballman detained Mr.

two reasons and

irrelevant for several others.

below (but the

district court

erroneously

encounter between Anderson and the ofﬁcer was not a
Alternatively, even if the initial encounter

detention but a consensual encounter.

it

0f criminal activity.”

brief, p.6.)

incorrect because, as the state argued

detention

district court erred in

denying his

observed Mr. Anderson walking after midnight in a suburban neighborhood

(Appellant’s brief, p.1.)

It

“The

claim:

district court erred in

was supported by ample reasonable suspicion

was a

that cannot credibly

be

described as a “hunch.”

2

Anderson’s

this

arrest for felony battery

Court concludes that the

initial

and attempted unlawful entry was proper even

stop

was unlawful,

if

as explained in section II.H below.

is a ground for afﬁrming that is independent
from the court’s decision on the initial stop. Therefore, the district court’s decision can
and must be afﬁrmed 0n this uncontested basis.

Thus, the search incident t0 arrest exception

And even assuming

(Ct.

App. 2006),

search

police; thus,

his ultimate capture

reasonable suspicion.

under State

was ultimately searched

Whether constitutional or

stop

would be

it

Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431, 146 P.3d 697

by police was a new detention

initial

that

incident t0 an arrest for attempted unlawful

all

was supported by

arrest warrants

improper detention. Not only

ultimately pleaded guilty to, “waiv[ing]

Anderson was

V.

Moreover, Anderson had several valid

was attenuated from any

66, 69, 106 P.3d 392,

was an improper

question of whether the evidence should be suppressed.

irrelevant to the ultimate

Anderson ﬂed from the

the initial encounter

that,

and the

but Anderson

entry—a charge he

non-jurisdictional defects and defenses,

statutory, in prior proceedings.”

State V. Al—Kotrani, 141 Idaho

395 (2005).

two counts 0f battery on law

also searched incident to an arrest for

enforcement. Regardless 0f the propriety of the

the battery arrest

initial stop,

was proper

because defendants are not entitled to attack the police following an unlawful detention.
State V. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509, 198 P.3d 735,

proper arrest for battery the

was appropriately searched
even assuming a ﬂawed

738

district court’s ultimate

(Ct.

App. 2008). In

Anderson

of the

conclusion was correct: Anderson

incident t0 arrest. (1 1/17/17 Tr., p.31, Ls. 12-15.)

initial stop,

light

fails t0

show

At any rate,

the district court erred

by

denying his motion t0 suppress.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“The standard 0f review 0f a suppression motion

0n a motion
0f

is

bifurcated.

When

a decision

t0 suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s

fact that are supported

by

ﬁndings

substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of

constitutional principles to those facts.” State V. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739,

741 (2007).

The power

to assess the credibility

weigh evidence, and draw

m,

of witnesses, resolve factual conﬂicts,
State V. Valdez-

factual inferences is vested in the trial court.

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State

555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).

The

implicit ﬁndings of the trial court supported

by

V. Fleenor,

133 Idaho 552,

appellate court also gives deference to any

substantial evidence. State V. Brauch, 133

Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 (1999).

C.

The

“An
Fourth

Initial

Encounter

Was

Consensual

encounter between a law enforcement ofﬁcer and a citizen does not trigger

Amendment

scrutiny unless

it is

nonconsensual.” State

482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (citations omitted).

T0

V.

Willoughby, 147 Idaho

constitute a seizure, the ofﬁcer

must, “by means of physical force or show of authority,” in some
individual’s liberty.

Li.

way

restrain

an

This “requires words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement

ofﬁcer that would convey to a reasonable person that the ofﬁcer was ordering him or her
to restrict his or her

mere questioning

is

movement.” Li

(citations omitted). “[A] request for identiﬁcation or

not enough, by itselﬂ,] t0 constitute a seizure.”

State V. Landreth,

139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2004) (citations omitted). “This
the person approached need not answer any question put to

t0 the questions at all

and go about his business.” State

V.

him and may

is

so because

decline t0 listen

Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-

524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Florida V. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-

498 (1983)). “Thus, where an ofﬁcer merely approaches a person who
street,

is

standing on the

or seated in a non-moving vehicle located in a public place, and poses a few

questions,

n0 seizure has occurred.”

Li. (citation omitted).

The relevant inquiry

is

whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would feel free to
disregard the law enforcement ofﬁcer”; if so, “then the encounter

Willoughby, 147 Idaho

at

486, 211 P.3d

Some examples of facts

that

is

consensual.”

at 95.

might show a seizure, “even where the person did not

attempt to leave,”

would be the threatening presence 0f several ofﬁcers, the display 0f a
weapon by an ofﬁcer, some physical touching 0f the person 0f the citizen,
0r the use of language or tone 0f voice indicating that compliance with the

ofﬁcer’s request might be compelled.
State V. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 168,

United States

V.

267 P.3d 1278, 1283

(Ct.

App. 2011) (quoting

Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). “Other circumstances that

indicate seizure include Whether the ofﬁcer used overhead

emergency

lights

may

and Whether

the ofﬁcer took action to block a vehicle’s exit route.” Li. (citing Willoughby, 147 Idaho

at

487-88, 211 P.3d

1272-73

(Ct.

at

96-97; State V. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 302-03, 47 P.3d 1271,

App. 2002); State

V. Fly,

122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 P.2d 942, 945

(Ct.

App.

1991)).

Anderson argued below
Ballman was a detention.
court agreed: “I think

‘Well,

(1

come 0n over

that the initial encounter

(R., p.74;

11/17/17 TL, p.22, L.16 — p.23, L.3.)

Brandon Anderson was detained

here and

let

me

between himself and Deputy

ask you your

at the point that the

The

district

deputy

said,

name and ask you some questions.”

1/17/17 Tr., p.30, Ls.18—21.)

This was an error.

was consensual. As

The

initial

encounter between Deputy Ballman and Anderson

the state pointed out below,

10

When Deputy Ballman

arrived he

was

weapon nor were

not brandishing a

his overhead lights activated.

(1

1/17/17 Tr., p.16,

L.25 — p.17, L.5.) During the encounter Ballman was four feet away from Anderson and

never touched Anderson.

“threatening presence” of additional ofﬁcers during the initial encounter.

compliance With the ofﬁcer’s request might be compelled.”

that

11/17/17 TL, p.8, L.24

me

—

p.9, L.5.)

As such

name and ask you some

ask you your

than a command.

(1

his invitation to

questions”

show a

detention.

Deputy Ballman or the

movement.

(E

driving; so he

was much

much ado below

There

(R., p.74.)

let

closer to a polite request

about “Deputy Ballman

perfectly capable of walking

11/17/17 Tr., p.6, L.24 — p.7, L.17.)

is

no indication

were blocking Anderson’s

patrol vehicle

11/17/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.13-16.)

was

(E

“come 0n over here and

Mr. Anderson between himself and the patrol vehicle,”

insufﬁcient t0

Tr.,

1/17/17 T11, p.30, Ls.18—21.)

Moreover, While Anderson made
[placing]

(E Prelim

There was no evidence that the deputy’s “language or tone of voice

p.9, Ls.4-14.)

indicat[ed]

There was n0

(11/17/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-15; p.17, Ls.8—10.)

if

was

in the record that

exits 0r

Anderson was walking

away

factor

this

freedom of

that night, not

he wanted t0 make an

exit.

(E

Anderson’s eventual ﬂight demonstrated exactly

that.

The sum

facts in the record are therefore insufﬁcient t0

single factor noted

for

by

show

the district court—the deputy’s invitation t0

questioning—was insufﬁcient, 0n

its

own,

t0

show

a detention.

And the

“come on over here”

a detention.

m

Idaho’s appellate courts Will afﬁrm a district court’s correct legal conclusion even

Where the

district court

applied an incorrect theory t0 reach that result.

E

Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275-76, 396 P.3d 700, 704-05 (2017) (declining to
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adopt a “wrong result-wrong theory”

wrong reason”

rule,

rule: “[w]hile the State

lower court decisions based 0n legal
correct result albeit

but afﬁrming the propriety of the “right result-

properly observes that this Court has corrected

we

error,

by way of erroneous

did so

when

legal reasoning”);

the lower court reached the

ﬂ

also State V. Akins, 164

Idaho 74, 423 P.3d 1026, 1034-35 (2018).

The

recognizes that the Idaho Court of Appeals recently narrowed the “right

state

result-wrong theory” doctrine.

the

trial

court t0 be

0n Which the

under

this

_

more

because the

afﬁrmed on the

district court is

1053379, *8,

P.3d

result-wrong theory’ basis, the alternate theory

(March

6,

still

have been presented below.” 2019

that this

argued in

But even

would

That

apply here.

still

brieﬁng and oral argument that the

its

1/17/17 TL, p.24, Ls.7-19; Aug. R., pp.5-6,

(1

WL

2019, petition for review pending).

restrictive interpretation, the doctrine

state explicitly

n0 question

‘right

afﬁrmed must

_

encounter was consensual.

is

In State V. Islas, the Court concluded that “[i]n order for

argument was presented below and

is

8.)

is

initial

Thus, there

a Viable ground for

afﬁrming now.

While the

district court incorrectly

ultimate conclusion

was

detained during the

initial

concluded that Anderson was detained

correct and should be afﬁrmed. Because

encounter the

district court

its

Anderson was not

properly denied the suppression

motion.

D.

Even Assuming The

Initial

Encounter

Was

A

Detention

It

Was

Supported

BV

Ample Reasonable Suspicion
Pursuant to the Fourth
“is permissible if

it is

Amendment 0f the United

States Constitution a detention

based upon speciﬁc articulable facts which justify suspicion that the

12

detained person

is,

has been, or

is

about to be engaged in criminal activity.”

Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing

392 U.S.

1,

21 (1968); United States

V.

totality

of the circumstances. State

V.

Tegy V.

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).

ofﬁcer had reasonable suspicion t0 conduct an investigatory seizure

State V.

Ohio,

Whether an

determined by the

is

Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522

(1992).

The

state disagrees that

Anderson was detained

assuming there was a detention, the
reasonable suspicion supported

I

think—in

Mr. Anderson
porch

light

left

on

the

district court correctly

However,

concluded that plenty of

it:

fact, I

in the

as explained above.

ﬁnd, as a conclusion here, that

roadway and walked up
middle of the night

t0 a

at the

point that

darkened house with n0

after a police car

had turned

around and the beginning 0f an attempt t0 contact that person, that there

was reasonable and

articulable suspicion that a crime

was

afoot.

Imean, that’s a suspicious criminal activity for a person to d0 that.
That was heightened then When the answer was given, Well, I’m going t0
ask for some water at this darkened out house and I don’t live here and I
may know somebody down the street that I might ask them for water. I
forget how that exactly went. But all 0f that was suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot.
I

all

here.

deputy

don’t think the attenuation doctrine really needs t0 be applied at
I

said,

was
come on over here and

think Brandon Anderson

“Well,

ask you some questions.”

detained at the point that the
let

me

ask you your

name and

But the Court ﬁnds he was appropriately

detained 0n a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity

being afoot.

Even though one could not say this was the crime being
this was absolutely good police work t0 be ﬁnding out a little
more about this fellow under these circumstances. And t0 detain him for
committed,

the investigation of whether a crime

illegal

had actually been committed or

not.

So the Court doesn’t ﬁnd that it was not a detention or that the—an
detention was attenuated by Mr. Anderson running for it, the Court
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ﬁnds this was an appropriate detention
Anderson over.
(1

1/17/17 TL, p.30, L.1

The

district

— p.32,

court’s

suspicious that Anderson

prior burglaries

after

conclusion was undoubtedly

was dressed

had been reported

(1

1/17/17 Tr., p.6, L.19

to a

-

(1

good police work)

1/17/17 Tr., p.30, L.1 —p.31, L.1

On

is

self—evidently

0f area Where

p.7, L.7; p.18, Ls.1-6); that

—

was

t0 detain

was not

his,

and

1/17/17 Tr., p.14, L.16

(1

that—

p.14, L.15); and

the ofﬁcer that the house

court correctly concluded this

constitutionally proper (and

It

completely darkened house after the ofﬁcer

he “was going to ask the occupants[3] for some water”
district

—

p.11, L.6; p.13, L.20

some hesitation—Anderson informed

The

right.

in all black late at night in the type

contact (11/17/17 T11, p.10, L.21

L.10).

time that he called Mr.

L.9.)

Anderson “immediately” walked up

made

at the

suspicious, and that

Anderson

in light

—

p.15,

it

0f the

that

was

facts.

1.)

appeal Anderson pooh-poohs this inevitable conclusion, dismissing the

ofﬁcer’s rationale behind the detention: “Ofﬁcer Ballman detained Mr. Anderson based

0n a hunch.

This was not good police work.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

Anderson

likewise claims that “[h]ere, Ofﬁcer Ballman had only a hunch that Mr. Anderson might

have been involved in criminal conduct When he observed him walking on the side of the
road ‘wearing

3

The

all

black.”’

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.) Anderson’s anti-hunch position fails

found that Anderson “[m]ay have said something about,
well, Iknow somebody a few houses away and maybe I was going t0 get some water from
them.” (1 1/17/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.10-16.) Of course, it would be even more suspicious if
that

district court alternatively

was What Anderson

said, as his

presence

at the ﬁrst

explicable.
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house would have been even

less

t0 persuade

because

The record shows

inapplicable here.

it is

that

Deputy Ballman was

not acting on a hunch.

A “hunch” is

E

a “feeling or guess based 0n intuition rather than fact.”

Oxford Living Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/deﬁnition/hunch

And

April 9, 2019).

late at night

Anderson

started

-

Anderson never claimed
it

—

Anderson was wearing

p.7, L.7; p.18, Ls.1-6.)

walking towards the unlit house only

(11/17/17 Tr., p.10, 21

top

fact that

—

p.11, L.6; p.13, L.20

to

off, there

know anyone who

p.14, L.15.)

lived there.

was Anderson’s unconvincing

going to ask the residents for some water.

(1

There was the

And

there

(E 11/ 17/ 17

was

their

homeowner would be

home

after midnight.

the fact that

Tr., p. 14,

— p.15,

was

L.10.)

The most

A police academy freshman patrolling this area would have an
Even Inspector Clouseau would be suspicious of

Anderson’s unsatisfying explanation—because

middle of the night to get water?

glaring suspicious facts;

Ls.16-

explanation: he claimed he

1/17/17 Tr., p.14, L.16

car.

suspicious of a stranger dressed in black skulking up t0

inkling to stop and investigate the same.

in the

fact that

squad

after seeing the

A11 of these facts taken together paint a manifestly suspicious picture.

trusting

all

while prowling the type of neighborhood Where prior burglaries had

(11/17/17 Tr., p.6, L.19

T0

There was the

facts.

occurred.

23.)

(last Visited

here Deputy Ballman’s suspicions were based not 0n intuition, but

0n plenty of known suspicious
black

Hunch,

all

who marches up

t0 strangers” unlit

homes

The Whole encounter was overﬂowing With

Deputy Ballman did was perceive them.

Panning his

reasonable, inescapable conclusion as a “hunch” simply fails t0 contend With the facts

that supported

it.
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Anderson’s actions provided ample reasonable suspicion to detain him for
investigation.

Anderson

show

fails to

the district court’s conclusion

incorrect.

Was An Improper Stop, Anderson Was
Properly Searched Following His Flight And Subsequent Seizure

Assuming Arguendo The

E.

The

state

Initial

Encounter

argued in the alternative below that even assuming Deputy Ballman

improperly detained Anderson during their

initial

initial

encounter, Anderson’s ﬂight ended any

detention and justiﬁed the eventual search and seizure. (Aug. R., p.9; 11/17/17 TL,

The

p.24, Ls.3-6, 17-19.)

state’s position

have had regarding his alleged
Ballman, he abrogated

was no longer the

was

that “[w]hatever

illegal detention

when he ﬂed from

[State V. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 431,

during his

district court

address this argument.

(Ct.

(E

alternative basis.

subsequent seizure,

it

concluded the

initial

now

After Anderson ﬂed any

Much

like the

defendant in

detention

it is

was justiﬁed

was improper,

initial

it

it

did not

However, on
should afﬁrm

detention ceased and the

supported by reasonable suspicion, would have been proper.
is

by

its

very nature suspicious. “Headlong ﬂight—

occurs—is the consummate act 0f evasion:

wrongdoing, but

encounter With Deputy

11/17/17 Tr., p.30, Ls.17-18; p.31, Ls.5-9.)

Fleeing from the police

Wherever

may

App. 2006)], when [Anderson] ﬂed he

appeal, even if this Court concludes the initial encounter

this

initial

the encounter.

146 P.3d 697

argument [Anderson]

subject of an unlawful detention.” (Aug. R., p.9.)

Because the

on

was

certainly suggestive of such.”

It is

not necessarily indicative 0f

Illinois V.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,

124 (2000). The Idaho Supreme Court has accordingly found reasonable suspicion and a
justiﬁed detention in a case With similar facts t0 this one:
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In this case, the facts available t0 the ofﬁcer

were

that

he saw Mr. Padilla

walking down an alley at about 2:00 a.m.; that he turned 0n his car’s
headlights and drove to a place near Mr. Padilla, positioned the car so that

Mr. Padilla could clearly see that it was a marked police car, and stopped;
and that, as he began getting out of the car, Mr. Padilla ﬂed. Mr. Padilla
did not merely run

away down

the sidewalk, alley, or street

ofﬁcer began getting out 0f the police

jumped over a

car.

He

when

the

ran between two houses and

fence. Considering the totality of the facts available t0 the

ofﬁcers, they had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe criminal
activity

may be

afoot and could seize Mr. Padilla in order to investigate

their suspicion.

Padilla V. State, 161 Idaho 624, 627, 389 P.3d 169, 172 (2016).

The

Padilla Court

therefore concluded that “the seizure 0f Mr. Padilla did not Violate his rights under the

Constitution of the United States.” Li.

Not only

is

ﬂight from police suspicious, but a seized defendant

the police terminates the detention—even if the detention

was unlawful. That was

case in Zuniga, Where the defendant’s “initial detention

unreasonable under Fourth

But Zuniga “decided

Amendment

protections.”

Li

the

by Detective Lathrop was

143 Idaho

at

436, 146 P.3d at 702.

t0 forgo the opportunity t0 challenge his seizure” properly;

complying With the ofﬁcer’s commands and raising the issue
hearing.

Who ﬂees from

later in a

i.e.,

by

suppression

“Instead,” Zuniga “chose to terminate the seizure through escape

from

[the

detective’s] authority.” Li.

The Court concluded
still

that “[i]t

would be a ﬁction

for us t0 hold that

Zuniga was

under seizure by Lathrop While he was running away and n0 longer submitting 0r

yielding to Lathrop’s authority.”

evidence that was later found as
Accordingly,

we

Li.

fruit

hold that

order t0 remain seated and

And

as a result, the Court

of the poisonous

would not suppress the

tree:

When Zuniga disobeyed

Detective Lathrop’s

ﬂed from the scene, he was n0 longer the
The chase by Detective Lathrop did not

subject of an unlawful detention.
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new

499 U.S. 621, 627
(2010)], until Zuniga was tackled by Lathrop. The methamphetamine
discarded by Zuniga and dropped by him when he was tackled was not the
fruit of the poisonous tree. The district court correctly concluded that the
evidence should not be suppressed.
constitute a

seizure under [California V. Hodari D.,

ZLnigg, 143 Idaho at 437, 146 P.3d at 703.

Even assuming

That same conclusion would inevitably apply here.

encounter was an unlawful detention, Anderson ceased being detained the

His headlong ﬂight from the ofﬁcers (coupled With

took off running.

suspicious facts already noted)

Thus, even assuming the
ultimate search)

F.

was

initial

moment he

all

the other

necessarily suspicious and justiﬁed a fresh seizure.

encounter was unlawﬁll the subsequent seizure (and

was proper and should be upheld on

Alternatively,

the initial

this alternative basis.

Even Assuming Anderson Was

Initially

Improperly Detained, The

Attenuation Doctrine Applies

The

presented an additional alternative argument below: that “even if there

state

had been a wrongful detention, said detention would be sufﬁciently attenuated from the
recovery of the Marijuana and paraphernalia, due to the discovery of ﬁve active
warrants.”

(Aug. R., p.8.)

properly seized

(E 11/17/17

it

Because the

district court

concluded that Anderson was

did not consider whether the attenuation doctrine would apply here.

T11, p.30,

Ls.17-18; p.3

1,

Ls.5-9.)

While the

attenuation question, if this Court reaches the question,

district court

it

did not reach the

should conclude that the

attenuation doctrine applies.

Under

the attenuation doctrine, evidence gathered following an improper stop

nevertheless be admitted

and the evidence

is

“When

may

the connection between unconstitutional police conduct

remote 0r has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so

18

that ‘the interest protected

by

not be served by suppression of the evidence 0btained.”’ Utah

2061 (2016) (quoting Hudson

would

the constitutional guarantee that has been violated

V. Strieff,

136

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)).

V.

whether the attenuation doctrine applies, courts 100k

S. Ct.

2056,

T0 determine

to three factors: “the elapsed time

between the misconduct and the acquisition 0f the evidence”; whether there were any
intervening circumstances, such as an arrest warrant; and whether the police misconduct

“is

purposeful orﬂagrant.” State

64 (2017) (emphasis in

V.

Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721-22, 404 P.3d 659, 663-

original, citing

M,

136

S. Ct.

2056).

weighed “strongly

In Cohagan, While the existence 0f an arrest warrant

attenuation,” the court found there

misconduct.

162 Idaho

at

was n0

in favor

of

attenuation due t0 purposeful 0r ﬂagrant police

721-726, 404 P.3d

at

663-668.

In that case there

was “no

‘bona ﬁde investigation”’—the ofﬁcers had “no cause” t0 stop the defendant, not only

because they had already identiﬁed him, but “because both Ofﬁcer Otto and Ofﬁcer
Curtis himself had already

at

conﬁrmed

723-24, 404 P.3d at 665-66.

Curtis t0 stop

that

Cohagan was not

In other words, “there

Cohagan and run a warrant check.” Li

the suspected individual.” Li.

was simply n0 reason
at

for

Ofﬁcer

724, 404 P.3d at 666. Because

the attenuation doctrine does not allow “unjustiﬁed, suspicionless seizure of citizens,” the

attenuation doctrine

was

inapplicable in that case. Li. at 726,

404 P.3d 668.

Here, as explained above, there was abundant suspicion and justiﬁcation for the

ofﬁcer t0 stop Anderson.

was justiﬁed

(E

11/17/17 Tr., p.30, L.1 — p.31, L.11.)

in investigating the matter

and he quickly discovered

several active arrest warrants. Because this

search,

was nothing

like

Ofﬁcer Ballman

that

Anderson had

an unjustiﬁed, suspicionless

and because the active warrants were an intervening circumstance strongly
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favoring the

the attenuation doctrine

state,

would apply

here,

and exclusion would be

improper regardless 0f the propriety of the detention.

Anderson Was Properly
Searched Incident To Arrest For Attempted Unlawful Entry (Which He Pleaded
Guilty To), And Felony Battery On An Ofﬁcer (Which Was A Lawful Charge In

Of The

Regardless

G.

Of The

Proprietv

Initial

Stop,

Any Event)
The
all

(1

district court

concluded that Anderson was properly detained and “therefore,

0f the evidence that ﬂows from that appropriate detention

1/17/17 Tr., p.3

1,

Ls.8-1

1.)

Moreover, the

Mr. Anderson ran for

appropriately gathered.”

district court additionally

evidence was properly seized during a search incident t0

When

is

concluded that the

arrest:

he was then seized and arrested.

it,

He was

searched incident t0 those arrests and he had committed offenses by
it and by resisting and then the items found on him.
So based

running for

on
(1

that, the

Court

is

denying Defendant’s Motion t0 Suppress Evidence.

.

..

1/17/17 Tr., p.31, Ls.12-17.)

This conclusion

is

uncontested 0n appeal and should be afﬁrmed as a matter of

course, as explained in Section

this

I

above.

m, 159 Idaho

at

555, 364 P.3d at 256.

But

conclusion should also be upheld on the merits, should this Court reach them.

Regardless of the propriety of the

initial

stop

Anderson was searched incident

among

attempted unlawful entry and for felony battery on a police ofﬁcer,

other things.

11/17/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.23-25; Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.10-12.)

(R., p.16;

“A
special

t0 arrest for

warrantless search

is

presumptively unreasonable unless

and well-delineated exceptions

it

t0 the warrant requirement.”

Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge

403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State

V. Ferreira,

20

falls

Within certain

State V. Kerley, 134

V.

New

Hampshire,

133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705

(Ct.

App. 1999)).

A

search incident t0 arrest

is

a well-established exception to the

warrant requirement and, as such, does not Violate the Fourth Amendment.

395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969);

California,

Anderson was arrested

Ke_rley,

134 Idaho

at 874, 11

for attempted unlawful entry,

among

p.16; 11/17/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.23-25; Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.10-12.)

guilty to this charge.

He

P.3d

at

Chime]
493.

other things.

(R.,

eventually pleaded

The record does not show

(R., p.94; 12/4/17 Tr., pp.25-31.)

V.

that

Anderson’s guilty plea reserved any rights to challenge the decision on the motion to

(E

suppress.

“waive[d]

all

R., p.94;

12/4/17 Tr., pp.25-31.)

As

such, Anderson’s guilty plea

non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, Whether constitutional or statutory,

in prior proceedings.” Al—Kotrani, 141 Idaho at 69, 106

P.3d

at 395.

Consequently, Anderson’s single-issue appeal challenging the suppression order

cannot undo the attempted unlawﬁll entry conviction—because he has waived any 4th

Amendment

challenge With respect t0 that charge.

properly arrested for attempted unlawful battery

arrest

was likewise

proper, and

its fruits

Li.

And

because Anderson was

(R., p.16), the search incident to that

should not be suppressed.

M,

395 U.S.

at

762-63.

Anderson was

also arrested for battering the deputies.

p.27, Ls.23-25; Prelim. Tr., p.14, Ls.10-12.) This arrest

(R., p.16; 11/17/17 Tr.,

would likewise be proper

in

any

m

event because even unlawfully detained defendants have no “underlying right” to attack

law enforcement.

This common—sense proposition was adopted in Idaho in

Lusby:

We

begin by noting that Lusby‘s use of physical Violence against the
ofﬁcer was a crime and was not justiﬁed by the ofﬁcer’s unlawful entry
into her

home.

It is

well established that an individual
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may not use

force to

peaceable arrest by one she knows 0r has good reason to believe is
a police ofﬁcer, even if the arrest is illegal under the circumstances.

resist a

Although a person

may

resist the

use of unreasonable force, she has “no

underlying right to resist the ofﬁcers’ attempt to
“[I]f a

person has reasonable ground t0 believe he

peace ofﬁcer,

it is

his duty to refrain

resisting arrest regardless
arrest.” Instead,

rights

of Whether 0r not there

and remedies afforded by the

The Lusby Court adopted

at

being arrested by a

is

is

should later pursue

civil or criminal law.

App. 2008).

the “nearly universal rule in

198 P.3d

510,

at

new crime
739.

is

American jurisdictions

by a physical

may have

unconstitutional search or seizure, a subsequent attack on the ofﬁcer

The Court accordingly held

there “did not derive evidence 0f this

that

attack

on

admissible notwithstanding the prior illegality.”

Indeed, “although ofﬁcers

unrelated to any prior illegality.” Li.

in

a legal basis for the

illegal arrest

a suspect responds t0 an unconstitutional search or seizure

the ofﬁcer, evidence of this

Li.

(Ct.

a peaceable arrest.”

from using force or any weapon

an individual subj ected to

146 Idaho 506, 509, 198 P.3d 735, 738

when

make

new

that

is

conducted an
a

new crime

because the ofﬁcers

criminal conduct from any exploitation of the

unlawful entry,” the “evidence of Lusby’s alleged battery 0n an ofﬁcer 0r other forceful
resistance

is

not suppressible.” Li.

And

therefore, the “evidence

0f the battery, evidence

of other criminal acts in resisting or obstructing the ofﬁcer, and evidence of paraphernalia

found in the search incident

to

Lusby’s arrest are admissible.” Li

That same result would apply here. Regardless of the propriety 0f the

Anderson had no underlying

was not

“derive[d]

battery in

right to attack the ofﬁcers.

from any exploitation” of the

Lusby was not derived from the unlawful

the ofﬁcers

Li.

The evidence of the

initial stop, just as

entry.

initial

EQ

stop

attack

the evidence of the

Because the battery on

was “a new crime,” evidence 0f Which was “admissible notwithstanding” any
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alleged prior illegality, the felony battery arrest

was likewise

search incident” to that arrest

One

incident t0 arrest exception in

But

this issue is nevertheless

its

The court concluded

court below.

it

the evidence

incident t0 those arrests,” and then gave

395 U.S.

(E Aug. R.;
was

therefore, “the

And,

Li.

at

762-63.

not raise the search

state admittedly did

argument below.

preserved because

proper.

M,

proper.

on preservation: the

anticipatory note

was

11/17/17 TL, pp.24-25.)

actually decided

was properly found

Anderson a chance

to

by

in a “search[]

comment.

(1

conclusion that the items were found pursuant t0 a search incident t0
11/17/17 Tr., p.31, Ls.12-22;

ﬂ

is

district court

Idaho

it

recently clariﬁed that “if the issue

can form the basis for review by

_, 436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019) (emphasis added).

Li.

on it—such

Thus,

if

as the

m

was argued

this Court.”

This

t0,

0r

because there

is

issues that ‘never surfaced’

an issue “surfaced below” because the

district court actually ruled

blood draw in

m

0r the search incident to arrest here—it

consequently preserved “and will be addressed” by Idaho’s appellate courts.
the district court decided the items here

were properly seized pursuant

is

Li Because

to a search incident

t0 arrest this issue is preserved for this Court’s review. (1 1/17/17 Tr., p.3

H.

(E

arrest.

below and

a “distinction between issues not formally raised

below.”

court’s

Appellant’s brief.)

The Idaho Supreme Court

m, _

1/17/17 TL,

Anderson made n0 noises below (and none on appeal) about the

p.31, Ls.12-22.)

decided by, the

the district

1,

Ls.12-18.)

The Felony Convictions And Attempted Unlawful Entry Conviction Should Not

Be Vacated

In

Any Event

Anderson frames

his request for relief in the broadest possible terms:

Court to “vacate his judgment 0f conviction” in
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its

entirety,

he asks

this

which would include the

felony battery 0n law

conviction.

enforcement convictions and the attempted unlawful entry

(E Appellant’s brief, p.10.)

But even assuming Anderson prevails on the merits challenging the
the felony counts should

still

not be vacated.

As

just explained,

underlying right to attack the police ofﬁcers.

M,

738-39.

was unlawﬁll

This holds true even ifthe

initial

stop

thing Anderson has ever claimed 0n appeal

prevails

on

his only issue

146 Idaho

at

initial stop,

Anderson had n0

509-10, 198 P.3d at

(ﬂ Q), Which

(ﬂ Appellant’s brief).

So even

is

if

the only

Anderson

and successfully suppresses the marijuana and paraphernalia on

account 0f an unlawful stop,

it

would not

affect the felony battery counts.

The felony

counts should, therefore, be afﬁrmed in any event.

Similarly,

even

if

Anderson prevails on appeal

conviction should not be vacated.

Anderson pleaded

and the record does not show he reserved any
suppression order with respect to

plea “Waive[d]

all

statutory, in prior

it.

(E R., p.94;

his attempted unlawful entry

guilty t0 attempted unlawful entry

right t0 appeal the district court’s

12/4/17 Tr., pp.25-31.)

That guilty

non-jurisdictional defects and defenses, Whether constitutional or

proceedings” With respect to that conviction. Al—Kotrani, 141 Idaho

69, 106 P.3d at 395.

at

Thus, because a Victory on this appeal cannot undo Anderson’s

conviction for attempted unlawﬁll entry, that conviction should likewise not be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

Alternatively, the state respectﬁllly requests the Court vacate the

judgment of conviction

only as to the misdemeanor possession and paraphernalia counts, and reverse and remand
the district court’s suppression order only with respect to those counts.

DATED this 24th day of April, 2019.
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